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MIDFIRST BANK v. RANIERI: AN UPDATE ON
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS UNDER MONTANA'S
SMALL TRACT FINANCING ACT
Tiffany B. Lonnevik
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent history of Montana secured land transaction law
reveals a continuous effort by both the legislative and judicial
branches of government to provide fair yet effective means of ob-
taining loans and securing their repayment. The enactment of the
Small Tract Financing Act' (the Act) in 1963 evidenced an effort
to foster a system mutually beneficial to both borrowers and lend-
ers by creating the trust indenture2 as an alternative to the tradi-
tional mortgage. Trust indentures provide for the transfer of legal
title to property not exceeding thirty acres 3 to trustees who, upon
borrowers' default, can foreclose the trust deeds judicially or
nonjudicially.4
In 1987, the judiciary made its contribution to the law gov-
erning trust indentures when the Montana Supreme Court decided
First State Bank v. Chunkapura,5 which extended the provisions
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-301 through -321 (1993) (original version at R.C.M. 1947
§§ 52-401 through -417 (3 Supp. II 1977)).
2. The trust indenture is referred to as "deed of trust" and "trust deed." These
phrases are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(1) (1993). The Act was originally limited to tracts of
three acres, but was amended in 1974 to involve tracts as large as fifteen acres, and again
amended in 1989 to reflect the present limitation of thirty acres.
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-304(3) (1993). The procedure for judicial foreclosure
elected under § 71-1-304(3) is dictated by the law on foreclosing the traditional mortgage
found at § 71-1-222 of the Montana Code. Conversely, the conditions for nonjudicial fore-
closure (known as "foreclosure by advertisement and sale" and, alternatively, as "foreclosure
by trustee's sale") are embodied in § 71-1-313; the actual sale is governed by the procedures
set forth in § 71-1-315.
Two significant differences exist between the two types of foreclosure. First, under judi-
cial foreclosure, the lender can seek a deficiency judgment if proceeds from the sale of the
property are insufficient to cover the remaining debt. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-305 (1993)
(applying § 71-1-222(2) of traditional mortgage law). In foreclosure by advertisement and
sale, the lender has no such right. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1993).
Second, under judicial foreclosure, the borrower is entitled to remain in possession of
the property for one year after the sheriffs sale, during which time the borrower may re-
deem the obligation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-305 (1993) (applying §§ 71-1-229 & -228 re-
spectively). In contrast, under foreclosure by advertisement and sale, the borrower must
relinquish possession of the property within 10 days after the trustee's sale and is not al-
lowed to redeem the obligation any time after the sale has occurred. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-
1-319 (1993).
5. 226 Mont. 54, 734 P.2d 1203 (1987).
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of the Act beyond their textual and literal meaning.6 However,
with this extension, the court raised a number of questions regard-
ing the implications of this decision on foreclosure proceedings
under the Act.' This Note identifies these questions, explores the
court's efforts to supply answers, and offers suggestions for clarify-
ing the ambiguities that still remain.
Part II of this Note provides an historical background of defi-
ciency judgment case law by discussing Chunkapura and its prog-
eny. Part III examines the most recent case, Midfirst Bank v.
Ranieri, recounting the facts and charting the Montana Supreme
Court's journey through precedent to ultimately resolve the legal
issues involved. Part IV provides an analysis of the Ranieri deci-
sion and its implications on future lender-borrower relations. This
section also raises policy concerns affecting improvement of the
law of trust deeds8 and proposes that Montana employ further ef-
forts to develop concise deficiency judgment guidelines that pro-
tect and clarify the rights of both lenders and borrowers. Finally,
this Note concludes in Part V with a summary of the effect of
Ranieri on the law of trust indentures.
II. BACKGROUND
In the landmark case of First State Bank v. Chunkapura, the
Montana Supreme Court extended section 71-1-317 of the Mon-
tana Code, which provides that deficiency judgments are not per-
mitted following nonjudicial foreclosure, to the judicial foreclosure
of trust indentures.9 On rehearing, the court limited its decision to
apply only to judicial foreclosures of trust deeds on "occupied, sin-
gle family residential property." 10 However, while stating that
lenders could not obtain deficiency judgments following judicial or
nonjudicial foreclosure of these trust deeds, the court did not de-
fine "occupied" or "residential" or specify when these determina-
tions should be made.
The court has been faced with resolving some of the ambigui-
ties that remained following Chunkapura by applying
Chunkapura to new factual situations involving judicial foreclo-
6. See Kathleen M. Magone, First State Bank v. Chunkapura: New Limitations on
Trust Indentures, 49 MONT. L. REV. 181 (1988).
7. See David J. Dietrich, The Montana Judicial and Non-judicial Foreclosure Sale:
Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 49 MONT. L. REV. 285, 310 (1988).
8. This portion of the analysis draws heavily from consultation with University of
Montana School of Law Professor Robert G. Natelson.
9. 226 Mont. 54, 734 P.2d 1203 (1987).
10. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. at 67, 734 P.2d at 1211.
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sures under the Act. For example, the court tried to flesh out the
definition of "residential" in First Federal Savings & Loan v. An-
derson," a case involving a trust deed executed by borrowers to
secure their family home. When the borrowers eventually put the
property up for sale, they rented it out in an unsuccessful effort to
make their loan payments.12 The court extended Chunkapura's
anti-deficiency protection to the borrowers in Anderson, refusing
to allow the brief rental of the property to taint the property's resi-
dential nature. 13
Additionally, in Trustees of the Washington-Idaho-Montana
Carpenters-Employers Retirement Trust Fund v. Galleria Part-
nership,4 the court reiterated its refusal to include commercial
trust deeds in Chunkapura's anti-deficiency protection. The Gal-
leria court allowed the lender to seek a deficiency judgment follow-
ing judicial foreclosure of a trust deed securing the borrower's com-
mercial warehouse.1 5
Finally, in First Western Federal Savings Bank v. Lence,16
the court attempted to clarify the meaning of "occupied" as the
term applied to a debtor's seasonal occupancy and rental of resi-
dential property. The Lence court held that the Chunkapura limi-
tation on deficiency judgments for occupied residences did not ap-
ply to a condominium resided in by the borrower during the
summer months only and rented out intermittently.1 7
Within this legal framework, the Montana Supreme Court
made its most recent attempt to remove the uncertainty still ex-
isting after Chunkapura and its progeny. The 1993 case of
Midfirst Bank v. Ranieri'8 embodies this effort.
III. MIDFIRST BANK V. RANIERI
The Ranieri opinion chronicles the court's confrontation with
the Chunkapura questions as it progresses through the various fac-
tual situations faced in the Anderson, Galleria, and Lence cases.
Ranieri neatly summarizes the court's earlier attentions to the ju-
dicial extension of section 71-1-317 of the Montana Code and anal-
11. 238 Mont. 296, 777 P.2d 1281 (1989).
12. Anderson, 238 Mont. at 298, 777 P.2d at 1282.
13. Lence, 255 Mont. at 301, 777 P.2d at 1284.
14. Galleria, 239 Mont. 250, 780 P.2d 608 (1989).
15. Galleria, 239 Mont. at 269, 780 P.2d at 619. For an in depth analysis of Galleria,
see Margaret K.Bentwood, Deficiency Judgment Relief in Montana Foreclosures, 53 MONT.
L. REv. 255 (1992).
16. 255 Mont. 7, 839 P.2d 1277 (1992).
17. Lence, 255 Mont. at 11-12, 839 P.2d at 1280.
18. 257 Mont. 312, 848 P.2d 1046 (1993).
1994] 549
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ogizes the instant facts to precedent.19 The Ranieri case represents
the court's continuous struggle to supply meaning to the ambigui-
ties of Chunkapura and to provide boundaries for the implications
of that decision on foreclosures of trust deeds.
A. The Facts
In 1983, Larry Ranieri (Ranieri) fulfilled his daughter's re-
quest that he rent out her townhouse in order to cover her monthly
loan payments. Because the rents received were inadequate to
cover the payments, Ranieri began paying the difference for his
daughter the following year and in 1984 gained title to the
townhouse.2 0 Shortly thereafter, Ranieri applied for refinancing in
hopes of reducing the monthly payments and possibly moving into
the townhouse with his wife until he sold it. To secure the loan, he
executed a trust indenture to Midfirst Bank (Midfirst). However,
after the refinancing was complete, Ranieri's intent to move into
the property was thwarted when his wife rented another house for
them to move into, so renters continued to occupy the
townhouse.2 1
Between 1984 and 1990, Ranieri rented the townhouse to sev-
eral tenants and claimed on his tax returns rental income in excess
of $20,000 and depreciation and business deductions totalling over
$50,000. Ranieri had personally stayed in the townhouse intermit-
tently for approximately one month over a seven-year span, al-
though only during periods of marital strife when the building was
available between renters.22
In 1989, Ranieri defaulted on his loan and made no further
payments. Consequently, Midfirst initiated a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure of the trust deed, but thereafter canceled the trustee's sale.23
Midfirst then began judicial foreclosure proceedings and sought a
deficiency judgment against Ranieri. 4 Disposing of the case on
summary judgment, the district court found for Midfirst and au-
thorized both the foreclosure and the deficiency judgment.2" The
19. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 315-18, 848 P.2d at 1048-49.
20. Id. at 313-14, 848 P.2d at 1046-47.
21. Id. at 314, 848 P.2d at 1047.
22. Id.
23. Id. Ranieri contends that Midfirst failed to notify him or anyone else of the cancel-
lation. Not until over three months after the originally scheduled sale did the trustee for-
mally canceled the nonjudicial foreclosure by filing a "Cancellation of Notice of Sale Under
Trust Indenture." Defendant's/Appellant's Brief at 8, Ranieri (No. 92-267) [hereinafter Ap-
pellant's Brief].
24. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 314, 848 P.2d at 1047.
25. Id. at 314-15, 848 P.2d at 1047.
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district court held that Ranieri did not qualify for the exception to
deficiency judgments set out by the Montana Supreme Court in
Chunkapura because he spent an insufficient amount of time at
the townhouse, choosing instead to rent it out for nearly seven
years.26 Ranieri appealed, arguing that the townhouse was neither
commercial nor unoccupied and thus was eligible for Chunkapura
protection.27
B. The Holding
The Montana Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the dis-
trict court's ruling. 28 The court held that Ranieri fell short of the
established requirements29 necessary to invoke the Chunkapura
prohibition of a deficiency judgment following judicial foreclosure
of a trust deed.30 Because Ranieri rented the townhouse most of
the time instead of inhabiting it as his primary residence, he had
not occupied the property as required. Further, the court found
that in Ranieri's hands, the subject property of the trust indenture
was commercial in nature.31 Thus, Ranieri was not entitled to the
Chunkapura protection, which over time had become limited in
application to trust deeds relating to "single family residential
property occupied by the borrower as his . . . primary legal
residence."32
C. The Reasoning
The supreme court relied exclusively on precedent to decide
26. Id. at 315, 848 P.2d at 1047.
27. Id. at 315, 848 P.2d at 1047-48. Additionally, Ranieri argued that the lower court
had offended both the Act and the "election of remedies" doctrine by allowing Midfirst to
switch before the scheduled trustee's sale from nonjudicial to judicial foreclosure. Id. at 318,
848 P.2d at 1049. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed this argument, holding that
neither any provision in the Act nor the election of remedies doctrine prohibited Midfirst
from halting the foreclosure by advertisement and sale prior to the trustee's sale and elect-
ing instead to proceed with a judicial foreclosure. Id. at 319-20, 848 P.2d at 1050.
28. Id. at 313, 320, 848 P.2d at 1046, 1050.
29. See First W. Fed. Say. Bank v. Lence, 255 Mont. 7, 839 P.2d 1277 (1992) (requir-
ing that borrower occupy the deeded property as his primary residence); Trustees of the
Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Employers Retirement Trust Fund v. Galleria Partnership,
239 Mont. 250, 780 P.2d 608 (1989) (excluding trust indenture on commercial property from
anti-deficiency protection); First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Anderson, 238 Mont. 296, 777 P.2d
1281 (1989) (including in anti-deficiency protection trust deed on residential property occu-
pied by borrowers as single-family home); First State Bank v. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54,
734 P.2d 1203 (1987) (granting anti-deficiency protection to deeds of trust relating to occu-
pied, single-family residential property).
30. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 318, 848 P.2d at 1049.
31. Id.
32. Id.
19941
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the Ranieri case. By applying Chunkapura and its progeny to the
instant facts, the court dismissed each of Ranieri's arguments and
reached a conclusion consistent with the lower court as well as
prior case law.
In contesting the appropriateness of allowing a deficiency
judgment, Ranieri initially argued that although he rented the
townhouse, he did so only to cover his loan payments. Hence, the
property of the trust deed was not commercial so as to prevent the
invocation of the Chunkapura exception, especially, he argued,
given his intention to make the townhouse his residence.3
To the contrary, the court held that the property was commer-
cial in nature. Ranieri's own tax returns, in which he claimed
rental income and took deductions for the property, were irrefuta-
ble manifestations of the property's commercial character.3 Fur-
ther, Ranieri continued to collect rents from townhouse tenants
even after he defaulted on his loan." Reiterating its decision from
Galleria,6 the court in Ranieri held that the anti-deficiency provi-
sion created in Chunkapura does not apply to trust deeds on com-
mercial property such as Ranieri's.3 7
In Galleria, the borrower procured a loan secured by a trust
indenture on a commercial warehouse that housed business ven-
tures. 8 Like Ranieri, the borrower leased the property to various
tenants to make the monthly loan payments. 9 However, when the
borrower defaulted and the sole bid by the lender at the sheriff's
sale was insufficient to pay the indebtedness,'40 the court in Gal-
leria allowed the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment against
the borrower given the trust deed's commercial nature.41 The
Ranieri court found the commercial classification of Ranieri's trust
deed equally applicable, thus allowing a deficiency judgment
against the borrower.42
Ranieri contested this comparison by asserting that the facts
of his case were more analogous to those in Anderson, in which the
court denied the lender the right to a deficiency judgment under a
rental situation.'3 In Anderson, the borrowers purchased a home
33. Id. at 315-16, 848 P.2d at 1047-48.
34. Id. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
35. Memorandum and Order at 3, Ranieri, No. CDV-90-942 (April 27, 1992).
36. 239 Mont. 250, 258, 780 P.2d 608, 613 (1989).
37. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
38. Galleria, 239 Mont. at 253, 780 P.2d at 610.
39. Id. at 254, 780 P.2d at 610.
40. Id. at 255, 780 P.2d at 611.
41. Id. at 258, 780 P.2d at 613.
42. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
43. Id. (citing Anderson, 238 Mont. 296, 777 P.2d 1281).
[Vol. 55
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with a loan secured by a trust deed to the property."" For the next
seven years, the borrowers used and occupied the dwelling on the
property as their principal
residence . 5 However, upon realizing they could no longer afford to
keep it, the borrowers put the real estate up for sale. During the
eighteen months the property was on the market, the borrowers
found it necessary to rent the property to various individuals to
make their loan payments. When they ultimately defaulted on the
loan, the court allowed the lender to judicially foreclose on the
property but denied a deficiency judgment against the borrowers
despite the brief rental period."
Ranieri maintained that the court's failure to attach a com-
mercial classification to the property rented in Anderson should
extend to the townhouse he rented, especially given the factual
similarities between the two cases: both the Andersons and Ranieri
financed the disputed property pursuant to the Act and both lived
in the property at times while renting it at other times.4 Since the
court refused to permit a deficiency judgment in Anderson, Ranieri
asserted that the court should defer to that ruling in the instant
case.
8
The Ranieri court, however, disagreed, finding no comparison
between the eighteen-month rental in Anderson and Ranieri's
seven-year rental. Further, the court noted that when the lender in
Anderson accepted the trust deed, the deed related to an occupied,
single-family residence, whereas the Ranieri trust indenture re-
lated to a townhouse operated as a rental unit.49 The significance
of this distinction compelled the court to maintain its position re-
garding the commercial nature of Ranieri's property. Ranieri did
not satisfy the required residential prong of the Chunkapura stan-
dard so as to invoke its protection from a deficiency judgment.50
Ranieri then argued that he had met the "occupied" aspect of
Chunkapura, which did not specify occupancy by the borrower
himself as a prerequisite to the invocation of the deficiency protec-
tion.51 However, the court had already rejected this argument in
First Western Federal Savings Bank v. Lence.52 There, the bor-
44. Anderson, 238 Mont. at 297, 777 P.2d at 1282.
45. Id. at 298, 777 P.2d at 1282.
46. Id. at 301, 777 P.2d at 1284.
47. Appellant's Brief at 14, Ranieri (No. 92-267).
48. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 317, 848 P.2d at 1048.
52. 255 Mont. 7, 839 P.2d 1277.
1994]
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rower delivered a promissory note to the lender for the purchase of
a condominium in Crystal Lakes, Montana, and secured the note
by a trust deed on the condominium. The borrower's primary resi-
dence was in Whitefish. The borrower occupied the condominium
for approximately eight years, but only as a secondary summer res-
idence which he eventually rented on an intermittent basis. When
the borrower defaulted on the note, the lender brought suit to judi-
cially foreclose on the trust deed and to recover a deficiency
judgment.6 3
The court in Lence found in favor of the lender, holding that a
deficiency judgment was available following judicial foreclosure of
the trust deed.54 Under Montana law, a person has only one legal
residence, 5  and the Chunkapura protection from deficiency judg-
ments applies to that residence exclusively. Because the borrower
never intended, nor ever made, the condominium his primary resi-
dence, as evidenced by his limited three-to-four-month occupancy
each year, he could not claim he occupied the unit under the
Chunkapura standard.5 ' Accordingly, the court in Ranieri refused
to accept Ranieri's claim of occupancy since he never made the
townhouse his primary residence but "spent, at the most, one
month [there] over [a] seven year span."58 Further, Ranieri himself
admitted that the townhouse was not his personal primary
residence."
Nor did the court accept Ranieri's contention that although he
did not personally reside in the townhouse, the tenants' inhabi-
tance of the property fulfilled the occupied aspect of
Chunkapura.a0 That proposition was also rejected in Lence, where
the court clarified this prong as requiring occupancy by the bor-
rower as his actual, personal, and primary residence. 1 The Lence
court explained that a borrower cannot invoke the Chunkapura
exception where the property borrowed against is occupied by
someone other than the borrower.62 To hold to the contrary on the
issue of occupied, the court stated,
53. Lence, 255 Mont. at 8-9, 839 P.2d at 1278.
54. Id. at 12, 839 P.2d at 1280.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-215 (1993) (defining a person's one legal residence in the
state as "the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or
temporary purpose").
56. Lence, 255 Mont. at 11, 848 P.2d at 1280.
57. Id. at 12, 848 P.2d at 1280.
58. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 318, 848 P.2d at 1049.
59. Id. at 317, 848 P.2d at 1049.
60. Id. at 317, 848 P.2d at 1048-49.
61. Lence, 255 Mont. at 11-12, 839 P.2d at 1280.
62. Id.
[Vol. 55
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/14
MIDFIRST BANK v. RANIERI
would pervert the limited nature of the Chunkapura exception; it
would allow a person to avoid the possibility of deficiency judg-
ment on virtually unlimited numbers of properties by merely en-
suring that each property was a residential unit and without re-
gard to whether the property was ever intended or used as a
personal, primary residence. 3
Here, even though renters inhabited the townhouse, Ranieri did
not meet the occupied element necessary to qualify him for the
judicial exception to deficiency judgments enunciated in
Chunkapura."
IV. ANALYSIS
Since 1987, the Montana Supreme Court, on four separate oc-
casions, interpreted its landmark decision in Chunkapura and an-
nounced the extent of that case's applicability to secured land
transactions.6 5 On the most recent occasion, the court in Ranieri
continued a pattern of distinguishing Chunkapura by eliminating
situations to which Chunkapura applies. Unfortunately, the court
also continued an established pattern of maintaining the obscurity
of the Chunkapura rule by leaving unanswered questions of pri-
mary importance to the effectiveness of the Small Tract Financing
Act. Of greatest significance is the court's failure to define "resi-
dential" and its failure to specify the time when that designation
should be made to determine whether the protection against defi-
ciency judgments applies to certain property.
A. Definitions of "Residential" Versus "Commercial"
While the court has made clear that the protection from defi-
ciency judgments applies only to residential and not commercial
trust deeds,66 it has failed to delineate what constitutes "residen-
tial." Nor has the court precisely characterized the elements of
"commercial."
The defendant in Ranieri tried to use to his advantage the
court's oversight of these matters by suggesting a definition of
commercial under which he would not qualify. Ranieri argued that
63. Id. at 12, 839 P.2d at 1280.
64. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 318, 848 P.2d at 1049.
65. Midfirst Bank v. Ranieri, 257 Mont. 312, 848 P.2d 1046 (1993); First W. Fed. Say.
Bank v. Lence, 255 Mont. 7, 839 P.2d 1277 (1992); Trustees of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont.
Carpenters-Employers Retirement Trust Fund v. Galleria Partnership, 239 Mont. 250, 780
P.2d 608 (1989); First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Anderson, 238 Mont. 296, 777 P.2d 1281 (1989).
66. See Galleria, 239 Mont. at 258, 780 P.2d at 613; Anderson, 238 Mont. at 300-01,
777 P.2d at 1284; Chunkapura, 226 Mont. at 67, 734 P.2d at 1211.
19941 555
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the court's holdings in Chunkapura and Anderson had contem-
plated a definition of commercial property like that found in sec-
tion 69-5-102(1) of the Montana Code, which states: "'Commercial
premises' means the premises where the business of selling, ware-
housing, or distributing a commodity or other business activity is
carried on or professional or other services are rendered. ' 'e7 As
such, Ranieri argued that his renting the townhouse did not qual-
ify the property as commercial since it was utilized solely as a per-
sonal home (albeit home to various renters), not as a business, and
thus could be distinguished as residential.88
However, as Midfirst pointed out, the statute on which Ranieri
relied was taken out of context and had no application to the in-
stant circumstance. 9 Rather, Midfirst suggested a more common
definition of commercial, such as that found in Black's Law Dic-
tionary: "relating to or connected with trade and traffic or com-
merce in general" and "occupied with commerce. '70 Additionally,
Midfirst urged the adoption of a definition previously enunciated
by other courts: "suggesting commerce, trade, business, industry,
[or] having financial profit as the primary aim. "71
While not specifically adopting Midfirst's proposed definition,
the Montana Supreme Court apparently was convinced by the for-
mer's suggestion. The court looked to the profit-producing nature
of the townhouse as evidenced by Ranieri's tax returns and held
that sufficient to classify the property as commercial.72 However,
by not seizing the opportunity to adopt a detailed definition of res-
idential, the court left unresolved issues regarding the applicability
of Chunkapura that, absent legislative action, the court must
eventually address when new fact situations arise.
For example, whether a duplex, four-plex, or similar multi-
unit arrangement, one unit of which the borrower occupies as a
67. Appellant's Brief at 16, Ranieri (No. 92-267) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-5-
102(1) (1993)).
68. Appellant's Brief at 17-18, Ranieri (No. 92-267).
69. Plaintiff/Respondent's Brief at 13, Ranieri (No. 92-267) [hereinafter Respondent's
Brief] (noting that the statute in question defines territory for electric utilities).
70. Respondent's Brief at 12, Ranieri (No. 92-267) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
337 (4th ed. 1951) (similarly defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 1990)).
71. Respondent's Brief at 12-13, Ranieri (No. 92-267) (quoting Roberts Enterprises,
Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 699 P.2d 479 (Kan. 1985)). Midfirst also mentions in its brief
other cases in which the renting of property was found a commercial activity. Id. (citing
Littlehales v. District of Columbia, 130 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (finding rents from office
buildings and apartment houses were derived from "business" or "commercial activity");
Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 432 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981) (considering apartment buildings
"commercial" properties)).
72. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
556 [Vol. 55
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primary residence but the remaining units of which produce in-
come to the borrower, qualifies for the Chunkapura exception re-
mains unclear. Nor is it clear whether a dwelling, housing not only
the borrower but also the borrower's business, qualifies as residen-
tial to receive the protection Chunkapura affords from deficiency
judgments. Unless the legislature clarifies the ambiguities inherent
in the existing statute, the court inevitably will face the task of
resolving these matters.
The Montana Legislature has entertained several proposals to
resolve the ambiguities by codifying detailed definitions of "resi-
dential." For example, in 1989 two bills were introduced that rec-
ommended such definitions as "real property that is a residential
dwelling for four or fewer families '73 and the more detailed
proposal:
[P]roperty that.., is the principal place of residence of the gran-
tor. The term is limited to:
(a) a single-family residence or a single unit of a condomin-
ium as defined in Title 70, chapter 23;
(b) a duplex, one unit of which is the principal place of resi-
dence of the grantor; or
(c) a mobile home as defined in 61-4-309 or a trailer if the
mobile home or trailer is described in the trust indenture and is
placed on or affixed to the real property that is the subject of the
trust indenture.74
Yet, despite these appealing clarifications of the law, the legisla-
ture enacted neither of these proposals.75
Other western states have enacted definitional legislation in an
effort to clarify their statutes (nearly identical to Montana's) re-
garding deficiency judgments on trust indentures. Oregon, for ex-
ample, defines residential as "property upon which are situated
four or fewer residential units and one of the residential units is
occupied as the principal residence of the grantor, the grantor's
73. H.B. 511, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989).
74. S.B. 313, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989). In addition, this proposal, along with
House Bill 511, recommended as a corresponding definition of commercial "real property
other than residential real property."
75. The House passed House Bill 511 by an overwhelming majority vote of 92:3 after
the second reading and 98:1 after the third reading, but the Senate Judiciary Committee
tabled the bill per recommendation of the bill's sponsor, who felt Senate Bill 313 adequately
addressed the issues at hand. The Senate passed Senate Bill 313 by an overwhelming major-
ity vote of 43:1 after the second reading and 49:1 after the third reading, but the House
rejected the bill 34:60. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HISTORY & FINAL STATUS OF BILLS &
* RESOLUTIONS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MONTANA FIFTY-
FIRST LEGISLATURE 405, 132 (1989).
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spouse or the grantor's minor or dependent child."7 6 Similarly, Cal-
ifornia defines residential as "a dwelling for not more than four
families.""
Why Montana has refused to follow the lead of its sister
states, or to adopt the useful recommendations of Montana legisla-
tors and lobbyists, is unclear. In any event, absent legislative ac-
tion, the court should consider adopting a definition of residential
for the purpose of discerning the availability of deficiency judg-
ments following judicial foreclosure of trust deeds. By adopting
definitions such as those previously submitted to the Montana
Legislature, the court may avoid confusion in the future and divert
unnecessary litigation over the matter.
B. When Is the Nature of the Property Determined?
Even assuming that concise definitions of "residential" or
"commercial" existed, when to apply those definitions to deter-
mine the nature of the property still would remain unclear. Under
the Small Tract Financing Act in its present form, it is indis-
cernible whether property is to be classified as residential or com-
mercial at the time of execution of the trust deed or, alternatively,
at foreclosure. This determination is crucial to the lender's ability
to obtain a deficiency judgment following judicial foreclosure and
is equally crucial for the borrower, who must ascertain at the con-
tractual outset the penalties that will attach to default.
From judicial interpretations of the Act-most recently
Ranieri-the question of whether lenders can take deficiency judg-
ments upon foreclosure seems to hinge on whether the debtor lived
in the residence the day the lenders closed the loan. The court in
Ranieri distinguished the borrower's position from that of the bor-
rowers in Anderson by specifically noting: "[W]hen the lender [in
Anderson] accepted the trust indenture, the deed related to occu-
pied, single family residential property, and the fact that the fam-
ily had rented it out briefly before sale did not preclude applica-
tion of Chunkapura."7 8 Thus, the borrowers in Anderson could
escape the classification of their property as commercial despite
their brief use of the real estate for monetary gain, because the
property was not so used at the time the trust deed was executed.
Contrarily, in Ranieri, the borrower rented the property at the
time the lender accepted the trust indenture and continued to be
76. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.705(3) (Supp. II 1991).
77. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West Supp. 1994).
78. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
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rented throughout Ranieri's ownership; thus, the property was not
immune from designation as commercial in nature.79
However, on appeal, Ranieri showed a weakness in the court's
reasoning by proposing two hypotheticals80 Under what appears to
be the current rule of characterizing property at the time of execu-
tion of the trust deed, a lender could take a deficiency judgment
against borrowers who rent out their home on the day the loan
closes, move into the home one week later, and occupy the home
for the next seventeen years. On the other hand, the lender could
not get a judgment against the borrowers who live in the home the
day the loan closes, but who in the next week move out and subse-
quently rent the property for the next seventeen years.8a
In response, Midfirst suggested that it would be unfair to have
as the point of determination the time of foreclosure, because
to leave the rights of a lender unknown at the time of the closing,
and completely dependent upon the use of the property and the
decisions by the borrower long after the loan has been closed, and
long after the lender had any right or ability to negotiate terms or
to make any decisions concerning the use of the property ...
would leave the lender without sufficient information to decide
whether or not to grant the loan. That detrimental effect to po-
tential lenders, and the resultant limitation on lending, certainly
was not the intent of the Small Tract Financing Act.2
Agreeing with Midfirst, the Montana Supreme Court impliedly se-
lected the date of closing as the proper classification date. 3 Per-
haps finding itself limited to the facts at bar, however, the court
did not address Ranieri's hypotheticals. By leaving the proper
course of action in these scenarios unstated, the court failed to re-
move a certain obscurity still plaguing secured land transactions.
As with the unclear definitions under Chunkapura and the
Act, the legislature considered proposals to set the timing for clas-
sification of the nature of a property."' Like the definitional pro-
posals, however, suggestions for codifying the designation timing
79. Id.
80. Appellant's Brief at 15, Ranieri (No. 92-267).
81. Id.
82. Respondent's Brief at 20-21, Ranieri (No. 92-267).
83. Ranieri, 257 Mont. at 316, 848 P.2d at 1048.
84. See, e.g., S.B. 313, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989) (originally proposing as the
time of designation of property as residential "the time the trust indenture is executed or
within 60 days thereafter," then amended to require the property "be continuously occupied
by the grantor or his successor in interest from the time the trust indenture is executed or
within 60 days of its execution through the date of the default and within 30 days of the
date of the trustee's sale").
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failed." Montana could follow the approach taken by neighboring
states such as Oregon, which enacted a classification date.86 Unfor-
tunately, lenders and borrowers in Montana remain without an-
swers and will continue to dispute the issue in and out of court.
C. Policy Considerations and Suggestions for Reform
To provide consistent instruction for parties to secured land
transactions, the court or legislature should closely examine the in-
tent of the Small Tract Financing Act and select definitions and
timing provisions that best further the Act's objectives.8 7 Assessing
the purpose of the Act initially seems easy given the codification of
the legislature's intentions in the Act itself.88 However, in examin-
ing both the legislative and judicial history of the Act and its ap-
plication, several policies are in fact at play, including protecting
(1) lenders' expectancies, (2) the availability of credit, and (3) bor-
rowers' financial stability. Where assessment becomes difficult,
then, is in determining which policies should predominate.
Since the enactment of the Act, the Montana Supreme Court
has continuously struggled to strike a balance between the various
policies and parties involved in executing trust deeds. For example,
the court in Chunkapura acknowledged that the Act was adopted
at the suggestion and for the benefit of the banking and lending
industry, which was becoming increasingly unwilling to extend
credit when on a borrower's default the lender's funds would be
tied up for the one-year period of redemption.89 Yet, the
Chunkapura court also recognized that the Act was intended to
protect borrowers against deficiency judgments in exchange for re-
moving their rights of redemption and possession for the benefit of
85. As mentioned previously, Senate Bill 313 was rejected after its second reading in
the House by a vote of 34:60. See supra note 75.
86. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.705(3) (Supp. 111991) (codifying the characterization of prop-
erty "at the time a trust deed foreclosure is commenced").
87. Perhaps the legislature would be the more appropriate forum for addressing these
matters since the court cannot randomly make such selections until a case specifically re-
quiring the court to do so comes along.
88. Section 71-1-302 of the Montana Code reads:
Because the financing of homes and business expansion is essential to the develop-
ment of the state of Montana and because financing of homes and business expan-
sion ... has been restricted by the laws relating to the mortgages of real property
and because more financing of homes and business expansion is available if the
parties can use security instruments and procedures not subject to all the provi-
sions of the mortgage laws, it is hereby declared the public policy of the state of
Montana to permit the use of trust indentures for estates in real property of not
more than thirty acres as provided in this [Act].
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-302 (1993).
89. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. at 56-58, 734 P.2d at 1204-05.
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lenders.90 This protection was necessary given the traditional fail-
ure of a foreclosure sale to bring in a price adequate to discharge
the debt and to avoid the resulting disastrous consequences to the
borrower, whose remaining real or personal property could then be
seized in satisfaction of the debt."'
The court decided Chunkapura at a time characterized by a
depressed economy, marked depreciation in property values, and
an increased number of foreclosures."' The court likely believed it
was benefitting both lenders and borrowers by precluding defi-
ciency judgments on the judicial foreclosure of trust deeds. How-
ever, the court was quick to limit its decision on rehearing, exclud-
ing commercial loans from the deficiency protection to reduce the
potentially adverse effect that protection could have on lenders.,"
Undoubtedly, continuing to subject commercial borrowers to
deficiency judgments appears to be the wisest policy decision from
both the lenders' and borrowers' perspectives. Extending
Chunkapura protection to businesses could have a devastating im-
pact on lenders, who would be left with huge sums owing on de-
faulted business loans but no method of recourse. In response,
lenders might have to increase the cost of credit by requiring larger
down payments and increasing interest rates to protect themselves
against such huge losses. 4 Correspondingly, business expansion
90. Id.
91. See George M. Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon Loans Secured by Land:
Growing Disparity Among Functional Equivalents, 23 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 37, 40 (1987).
It is also interesting to note that other states have adopted fair market value statutes in
an effort to protect the borrower from egregious consequences. See generally Chunkapura,
226 Mont. at 60-62, 734 P.2d at 1206-08. For example, Washington law provides that, in
rendering judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage or trust deed, the court "may in its discre-
tion, take judicial notice of economic conditions, and after a proper hearing, fix a minimum
or upset price to which the mortgaged premises must be bid or sold before confirmation of
the sale." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (West 1993). For further examples, see UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (1993); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1512 (1993) (mandating that before
rendering deficiency judgment, "the court shall find the fair market value of the real prop-
erty sold at the time of sale ... [and] may not render judgment for more than the amount
by which the entire amount of indebtedness due at the time of the sale exceeds the fair
market value").
92. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. at 62-63, 734 P.2d at 1208.
93. Id. at 66-67, 734 P.2d at 1210-11.
94. Third-Party Respondent's Reply Brief at 9, 15, Trustees of Wash.-Idaho-Mont.
Carpenters-Employers Retirement Trust Fund v. Galleria Partnership, 239 Mont. 250, 780
P.2d 608 (1989) (No. 89-29). The respondent also noted that a holding which rendered all
non-complex commercial trust deed loans non-recourse "would result in numerous required
factual determinations by Montana's District Courts thereby opening wide the floodgates of
unnecessary and unuseful litigation." Id. at 9; see also Hearings on S.B. 313 Before the
House Bus. & Indus. Comm., S.B. 313, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 8, 1989) (statement
of proponent Chip Erdmann reporting that many lending institutions have had to raise
down payments "so that the borrowers have a sufficient investment in the property to pre-
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would be hampered due to borrowers' inability to furnish these
substantial down payments or pay higher interest.
This sort of balancing must be employed when critiquing the
law in its current form. Certainly, the oscillation that has plagued
the court in the past will continue absent some degree of reform.
The court or legislature must weigh heavily the interests involved
and the policies underlying the Act in designing much-needed im-
provement in the existing law. Further, reformation will entail the
integration of Chunkapura and its progeny with these interests
and policies.
For instance, consider the establishment of a specific point at
which the property of a trust deed will be classified as either resi-
dential or commercial for purposes of deficiency judgment availa-
bility. If protecting the lender's expectancy is to predominate sche-
matic reform, the court or legislature should adopt a time-of-loan
distinction. Under this option, lenders will know at the contractual
outset what risks they are assuming, and can better assess their
financial security. On the other hand, if protecting borrowers is of
primary concern, the court or legislature should adopt a foreclo-
sure date rule, thereby allowing borrowers to dictate how lenders
may proceed against them and thus securing their economic stabil-
ity. Finally, if protecting the availability of credit is to prevail, per-
haps Chunkapura and its progeny, including Ranieri, should be
discarded, since lenders who are precluded from obtaining defi-
ciency judgments in many circumstances will be less willing to ex-
tend credit given their inability to insure their pecuniary interest.
Unquestionably, any lean toward one policy over the others,
while satisfying one party's interests, will by its very nature dissat-
isfy the other party involved. That is what makes any court or leg-
islative action prospectively so difficult. Nevertheless, either
branch of government would undoubtedly better the relations be-
tween lenders and borrowers, as well as improve the effectiveness
of trust indentures, by issuing specific definitions of residential and
commercial property and establishing classification dates.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of legislative codification of the Chunkapura
rule, the Montana Supreme Court in recent decisions has inter-
preted and refined the rule by applying Chunkapura to different
factual circumstances. In so doing, the court has tried to make one
clude them from merely abandoning it.. .[thereby] preclud[ing] many buyers from entering
the market").
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thing clear: the prohibition against deficiency judgements following
judicial foreclosure applies only to trust deeds involving property
that is (1) occupied by the borrower and (2) the borrower's pri-
mary residence.
While the rule in its most basic form may seem clear, its sub-
tleties and practicalities are not. The Midfirst Bank v. Ranieri de-
cision is just one link in a chain of cases which have sought to clar-
ify Chunkapura's muddy waters. Yet the court has left
unaddressed important questions, the answers to which are para-
mount to removing the ambiguities now inherent in Montana law.
Additionally, Ranieri, while helpful, calls into question the success
of any reform in striking a balance between all interested parties
and in reaching results consistent with the purposes of the Act.
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The University of Montana
School of Law
Career Services Office
The University of Montana School of Law currently offers career services
to students and employers. Students have access to resources, workshops
and on-campus interview programs through the Career Services Office.
We welcome and encourage employers to use the Law School's Career
Services Office. We offer a full range of services to employers that will
assist them in locating qualified applicants for positions such as summer
interns, clerks and associates.
Many employers choose to conduct interviews at the Law School and are
thus able to interview a relatively large number of students in a short
amount of time. We are pleased to make interview rooms at the Law
School available to you, at any time, for interviews. We do offer two
On Campus Interview Programs, one in the Fall, the other in the Spring.
Employers are encouraged to visit with faculty about any concerns or spe-
cial needs they may have and learn more about the legal education stu-
dents receive at The University of Montana School of Law.
For those employers choosing not to interview at the Law School, we will
post notices of job opportunities on our job board, which is located in a
central place in the school, and collect application materials. If applica-
ble, we will mail out notices to our alumni mailing list (attorneys seeking
employment).
If you have questions or seek additional information, Christine Sopko,
our Career Services Coordinator, will be happy to discuss with you the
full range of our career services. She may be reached by calling 406/243-
5598.
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